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JUDGE AND JURIST IN THE CIVIL LAW: A
HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION*
Peter G. Stein**
All lawyers are familiar with the way different legal traditions develop notions which become part of their traditional mythology, to
which everyone pays lip service, but which all recognize have been
overtaken by contrasting reality. Very broadly, the official myth in the
civil law is that, although academic writings have authority, judicial
decisions have none; in practice, however, great attention is paid to the
latter.' As all law librarians know to their cost, the publication of case
Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
*

This article reproduces the text of Professor Stein's address at the 1985 John H.

Tucker, jr. Civil Law Lecture at Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
**
Regius Professor of Civil Law in the University of Cambridge and Fellow of
Queens' College.
1. For surveys of the current position in France, see, e.g., H. Mazeaud, L. Mazeaud,
J. Mazeaud & J. Chabas, Legons de droit civil 134 (7th ed. 1983); J. Carbonnier, Droit
Civil 148 (10th ed. 1974), in The Role of Judicial Decisions and Doctrine in Civil Law
and Mixed Jurisdictions 91 (J. Dainow ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as The Role of Judicial
Decisions]; E. de la Marnierre, tlments de m(thodologie juridique 123 (1976); C. Atias,
R~flexions sur les m~thodes de la science du droit, 1983 D. S. Chron. 145 (arguing for
a revival of "controversist" argumentation pro et contra). For a comparison of the French
and Louisiana methods, see A. Yiannopoulos, Jurisprudence and Doctrine as Sources of
Law in Louisiana and France, in The Role of JudicialDecisions, supra at 69.
In German law the question is treated in a more abstract way. See K. Larenz,
Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft 350 (4th ed. 1979), in The Role of JudicialDecisions,
supra at 133; J. Esser, Grundsatz und Norm in der richterlichen Fortbilding des Privatrechts
(2d ed. 1964); H. Pawslowski, Methodenlehre fur Juristen (1981). For outside views, see
M. Fromont & A. Rieg, Introduction au droit allemand (R~publique F~d~rale) 208 (1977);
R. David, Le r6le des juristes dans I'6laboration du droit selon la conception traditionelle
du syst~me de droit Romano-Germanique, Vom Deutschen zum Europaischen Recht:
Festschrift H. D61le 361 (1963). For a valuable historical survey, see E. DOhring, Geschichte
der Deutschen Rechtspflege seit 1500 (1953).
For Italian Law, see M. Cappelletti, J. Merryman & J. Perillo, The Italian Legal
System: An Introduction 164 (1967).
For a panoramic historical and comparative survey, see W. Fikentscher, Methoden
des Rechts in vergleichender Darstellung, Vols. 1-5 (1977). For a recent critique, see A.
Watson, Sources of Law, Legal Change and Ambiguity (1984); and for an analysis by
civil law historians and modern jurists, see Legge, Giudici & Giuristi, Atti del convegno
tenuto a Cagliari, Maggio 1981 (Pubblicazioni della FacoltA di Giurisprudenza dell' UniversitA di Cagliari, Vol. 26, 1982).

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 46

law reports in civil law countries is a massive industry which reflects
this reality. Similarly in the common law, although officially only judicial
decisions are authoritative and academic opinions are not, in practice,
especially in the United States, 2 great attention is paid to academic
opinions and many published judgments are so replete with citations of
academic writings that they look more like law review articles.
Does this mean that the problem I have posed, the relation between
judge and jurist in the civil law, with the implication that it is different
from their relationship in the common law, is not a real problem at
all? Is it just a will o' the wisp puzzle produced by the fetid imagination
of an academic pedant? As a legal historian, I believe that legal history
provides a key to open real problems, but is this a real problem? I
believe it is.
To state the matter in the stark terms that I have done is to mask
many nuances and subtle differences in the way case law and academic
writings are regarded in the civil law and common law traditions. We
must ask whether what we call case law is the same in the civil law as
in the common law; whether the function of doctrine is the same in
both systems.
When we speak of the civil law, there is a tendency to assume that
its characteristic feature is that it is codified, in the sense that the whole
law is expressed in a coherent, systematic authoritative form. But the
earliest modern codes are little more than two hundred years old, and
there are still one or two indisputable civil law systems that are uncodified, notably that of the Republic of San Marino. 3
The civil law was developing for at least five hundred years before
the codification movement became fashionable in the eighteenth century,
i.e., from the re-discovery of the texts of Justinian in twelfth-century
Italy. Surely we can presume that it had found its identity before
codification became the vogue.
So it is in the pre-code period that I propose to seek the features
of the civil law. This period can be divided roughly into two parts,
divided at about the year 1500. The first, from 1100 to 1500, saw the
rise of the European common law, ius commune, and the second, from
1500 to 1800, saw the adaptation of that law by court practice to the
needs of nation-states.

2. R. Pound, The Formative Era of American Law 138, 159 (1950); cf. Stein, The
Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 52 Va. L. Rev. 403 (1966)
(on the need for systematic treatises).
3. P. Stein, Civil Law Reports and the Case of San Marino, R6misches Recht in
der eiuropiischen Tradition 323-38 (Festschrift fiir Franz Wieacker zum 75 Geburtstag, 0.
Behrends ed. 1985).
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THE PERIOD OF THE Ius COMMUNE

4
The main feature of medieval law in Europe was its pluralism.
There was no territorial unity of law within the various principalities.
Within the same state, there were different sets of laws for different
regions; there were also different sets of laws for different social classes:
nobles, peasants, merchants. Additionally, there were different sets of
laws for different aspects of life: matters of personal injury would be
dealt with by courts of lay judges applying traditional unwritten customs;
landholding was governed by feudal law; personal status, marriage, and
succession to movables were the province of the canon law of the church.
This plethora of overlapping jurisdictions meant that outside the
area of the canon law, which was international, the sources of law were
a jumble of local customs and statutes, which often did not provide
answers in cases of any complexity. As long as the judges were parttime laymen applying traditional custom, they would make up an appropriate rule according to their sense of justice. Increasingly, however,
princes created courts with professional judges whose whole work was
the administration of justice. In cases of doubt, these judges drew on
their university training.
The medieval university saw as its task the transmission of the
learning of antiquity, as recorded in recognized books of authority. In
theology these were the Bible and the church fathers; in law they were
the Corpus Juris of Justinian. The main university for law was Bologna,
which had two law faculties, one for the canon law of the church and
another for Justinian's law, which was begining to be called civil law,
to distinguish it from the canon law. Students flocked to Bologna from
all over Europe, and by the thirteenth century there were over a thousand
foreign students enrolled. The system developed there became the model
for all European universities. The only laws that were worthy of study
in a university were those that transcended national boundaries, that
were universal in scope, and the only laws that satisfied that criterion
were the canon and the civil. All other laws were excluded, even in the
English universities of Oxford and Cambridge.'
Justinian's texts are not easy to understand. They are about twice
the size of the Bible and except for a small part, the Institutes, the
arrangement of the material is very confused. The individual rulings
and distinctions between cases show enormous subtlety and technical
skill, but their sheer bulk and complexity have intimidated many gen-

4. For what follows, see Coing, The Roman Law as ius commune on the Continent,
89 L.Q. Rev. 505 (1973).
5.

The first chair of English law at an English university was the Vinerian Profes-

sorship at Oxford, which was accepted by Blackstone in 1758 after his failure to obtain
the Regius Professorship of Civil Law there.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol, 46

erations of students. The first law professors at Bologna, the so-called
glossators, concentrated on pure exegesis: they cross-referenced the whole
Corpus of texts, bringing together those dealing with similar topics,
reconciling apparent contradictions, summarizing, and so on. They treated
the texts themselves as sacred, so that all exposition was limited by the
meaning the texts could in totality bear. But the range of those texts
was such that somewhere in the Corpus one could find the answer to
any conceivable question of law. Accursius synthesized the work of the
glossators in his Great Gloss, and when he asserted categorically, "everything is found in the Corpus Juris, ' ' 6 he did not seem to exaggerate.
The glossators introduced the idea that what was important in a legal
argument was the support of a text from somewhere in the corpus of
authorities; it did not have to be from the context of the argument,
for Justinian had stated that his compilation was a complete whole,
with no contradictions.
The products of this kind of legal training, the juristae, became the
meritocrats who were recruited by princes to serve their councils and
staff their courts. They naturally analyzed legal issues in the way they
had been taught. They applied the appropriate local law to those issues,
but they interpreted that law according to the techniques of Roman
law, and when they found a gap in the local law they applied the
Roman rule. Whatever their national origin, the juristae shared the same
legal culture, based on the same texts, expounded in the universal
language of the educated people, Latin. So also they shared their legal
experience. For example, in the thirteenth century the city of Lubeck
asked the city of Hamburg what rules were applied in Hamburg to a
certain question of maritime law. The Head of the Chancery at Hamburg
could not find any specific rules in the Hamburg statute book or custom.
But since he was university trained, he translated certain passages from
Justinian's Digest into German and sent them to Libeck, stating that
they were the law of Hamburg, and thereafter the Roman rules were
followed. 7 In this way Roman law infiltrated into local laws.
It was not until the fourteenth century that the so-called commentators began consciously to adapt Roman law. The commentators used
manuscripts of the Corpus Juris accompanied by Accursius's Gloss and
made no distinction between the two. Without the glossators' explanations and cross-references to analogous texts, Justinian's law was
incomplete; so the rule was accepted, "What the Gloss does not recognize, the court does not recognize. ' ' 8 As a fifteenth-century commen-

6. G1. notitia ad D. 1.1.10.
7. See Coing, supra note 4, at 514 (citing H. Reinke, Fruhe Spuren R6mischen und
Kanonischen Rechts in Niedersachsen, Festschrift Haff 174, 177 (1950)).

8. Quicquid non agnoscit glossa nec agnoscit forum.

19851

JUDGEAND JURIST

tator, Fulgosius, stated: "In court I would rather have the authority of
the Gloss on my side than a text; otherwise it will be said: do you
think the Gloss has not seen that text and has not understood it as
well as you?" 9 Hence the idea that authoritative juristic comment on
a statutory text is itself an authentic source of law.
The commentators, led by Bartolus of Sassoferrato, were faced with
problems of the validity of local custom and the conflict between local
law and the imperial law of Justinian. The glossators had argued that,
if a local custom or statute differed from the Roman law, then the
latter, as the imperial law of the whole empire, must prevail, and they
cited specific texts to that effect. But local popular feeling, particularly
in the fiercely independent Italian city-states, would not tolerate that.
Bartolus took a more realistic attitude to the problem than his predecessors.'0
Justinian's Digest and Code did not lay down broad general rules.
They dealt with specific cases, and some of them referred to the existence
of local customs that did not contradict the general law. Bartolus built
up general rules from these particular case rulings. For example, when
land was sold, the seller was bound to guarantee the buyer against
eviction by a third party, but the form of the security that the seller
had to provide was left to the. parties, and one text says that this was
governed by the custom of the region in which the sale was concluded.
Bartolus generalized this ruling, deducing that in legal transactions generally form is governed by local law. But what if the local law contradicted the general law? The custom of Venice held that a testament
was valid if signed by three witnesses, but Justinian's law required a
minimum of five witnesses." Bartolus had to consider whether the
Venetian custom was valid.
First, he seeks the reason for the rule that a local custom which
infringes the imperial law is held void. It must be because there is a
presumption that it is therefore a bad custom. But there were cases in
the texts where the emperor allowed such a conflicting custom to exist
and in effect granted an implied privilege excepting the custom from
the general rule. This shows that it was possible to rebut the presumption
that a conflicting custom was bad. But what if the custom grew up
after there were emperors who could grant such exceptions? Bartolus
argues that the rule of Justinian's law must have invalidated only customs
already in existence. So far as later customs are concerned, they can

9. W. Engelmann, Die Wiedergeburt der Rechtskultur in Italien durch die wissenschaftliche Lehre 196 (1938).
10. P. Stein, Bartolus, the Conflict of Laws and the Roman Law, Multum non
Multa: Festschrift for Kurt Lipstein 251 (1980).
11. Code Just. 6.23.29, 31; cf. La. Civ. Code art. 1581.
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be valid, provided that the presumption is rebutted that, since they
contradict the imperial law, they must be -bad. In the instant case,
Venetians know their own needs best. If they feel it unreasonable to
expect five citizens to stop their business to witness a testament and
think they can manage with only three, then such a rule is valid.
In this way Bartolus turned the Roman rule on its head. But it is
important to note that in doing so, he observed the conventions of
Roman law itself. That law provided the grammar for all arguments of
general jurisprudence. Such argument only carried authority if it purported to bring out what was latent in the Roman texts, even if it was
not so expressed. So Bartolus and his followers created what was effectively
a new law out of the old Roman law, and because of its general
acceptance, it was called ius commune, the common law of Europe.
When, for example, a sixteenth-century Scottish statute refers to "the
common law,"' 2 it means this law and not the English common law.
The Bartolists tended to treat all law as written law; so, in effect,
a local custom was only respected if it had been put into authoritative
form such that it could then be subjected to the techniques of textual
interpretation developed by the commentators of Roman law.
In a true unwritten customary system, the theory is that the rules
themselves are fixed by traditional practice, but no particular verbal
formulation of that practice is final or authoritative, so that the rules
can continuously be re-formulated to make them fit new circumstances.
This is how the English common law is supposed to have developed.
The common law attorney feels more comfortable when he can cautiously
express an old rule in new words that will make it applicable to a new
situation while still keeping it recognizably within its earlier history. On
the other hand, he tends to treat a statutory text in the way he treats
other formal documents, such as a deed of conveyance or a testament,
with scrupulous attention to the language used. As a result, statutes
tend to be drafted like conveyances.

12. 1583, cap. 98. This ambiguity in the meaning of the phrase "common law" was
possibly exploited by Edward Livingston in an unreported case before Judge J.B. Prevost
of the Superior Court of the Territory of Orleans in November 1805 (for the date, G.
Dargo, Jefferson's Louisiana: Politics and the Clash of Legal Traditions 225 (1975)). The
second organic Act of Congress for the Territory of March 2, 1805 (Statutes at Large
II 322, (R. Peters ed. 1854)) incorporated by reference the provisions of the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, which required "judicial proceedings according to the course of the
common law," although the Act also specifically excluded rules of succession to property
and authorized the continuance of existing local laws not inconsistent with its provisions.
Livingston's argument that "common law" should be understood as "common law of
Louisiana" and therefore as the Roman Civil law was accepted by the court; W. Hatcher,
Edward Livingston: Jeffersonian Republican and Jacksonian Democrat 117-19 (1940); cf.
C. Hunt, The Life and Services of Edward Livingston: An Address 16 (1903).
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The civil law attorney, by contrast, is only really at home with
written law, that is law formulated in an authoritative text which he
can subject to the techniques of interpretation. There were procedures
for discovering a custom by inquest, but increasingly the only customs
which professional lawyers recognized where those that had been put
into written form. Even private compilations that were not officially
authorized acquired quasi-official status, and the laws they evidenced
survived when other neighbouring customs, which had not been so
compiled, disappeared. Thus Saxon law, which was the subject of an
official collection by a thirteenth-century knight, the Sachsenspiegel, 3
resisted Romanization when other Germanic customs succumbed. Later,
it was the movement to "codify" the French customs in the sixteenth
century 4 which ensured their survival to the end of the ancien regime.
This tendency of professional judges to prefer written to unwritten
law and to turn to academic authority to guide them was strengthened
by the procedure they adopted. 5 This was the Romano-canonical procedure, which had been developed in the church courts. It placed the
whole case in the hands of professionals, and all lay participation, such
as the remission of fact-discovery to a jury, was excluded. As a result,
it was no longer necessary to have a "set-piece" trial, with the parties
and their respective witnesses confronting each other in oral battle.
Instead there would be a series of meetings with all the proceedings
recorded in writing. The legal issue emerged as the facts were discovered,
and in regard to fact-discovery a different epistemology applied from
that of the adversary procedure. Facts were discovered in the absence
of the parties and their representatives. Witnesses were not subject to
public examination and cross-examination. It was thought that they
would be more likely to tell the truth if they were examined in private
by a single judge who then committed the evidence he obtained into a
written narrative. This narrative was sent to the whole court, which
discussed the legal issue that the facts revealed. After the initial proceedings, there was little interaction between ,bench and bar, and in
some countries, such as France, the judgment was given without any
reasons for it being declared.
This procedure had two important consequences. First, the parties'
advocates had to anticipate what evidence would emerge and what legal

13. See A. Watson, supra note 1, at 38. For a detailed account, see Harding, Regiam
Majestatem Among the Medieval Law-Books, [1984] Jurid. Rev. 97, 101.
14. Dawson, The Codification of the French Customs, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 765 (1939).
15. J. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law 273 (1968); R.C. van Caenegem, International
Encyclopedia of Comparative Law Vol. XVI 2.28; P. Stein, Safety in Numbers: Sharing
of Responsibility for Judicial Decision in Early Modern Europe, Diritto e Potere nella
Storia Europea (Atti IV congresso internazicnale della societA italiana di storia del diritto)
211 (1982); [19821 Jurid. Rev. 186; cf. P. Stein, Legal Institutions: The Development of
Dispute Settlement 34 (1984).
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issues it would produce, and as a result their written briefs tended to
be dissertations ranging over the whole area of law, with citations
directing the court to the best available commentaries. Secondly, the
procedure required a much larger number of judges than, for example,
a system using juries, since there was more work to be done. Instead
of leaving the time-consuming fact-discovery to laymen, the judges had
to do it themselves. Furthermore, appeals are not generally possible from
the verdict of a lay jury, but all professional decisions are subject to
review by a higher court. All courts therefore had many judges and,
in accordance with the idea of "safefy in numbers," they deliberately
emphasized that all decisions were made by the court as a whole and
were not the responsibility of individual judges. Thus, the bureaucratic
nature of the civil law procedure encouraged judges to disguise their
personal contributions.
THE PERIOD OF THE USUS MODERNUS

In the sixteenth century a number of factors appeared which altered
the picture with regard both to the role of the courts and to the function
of the jurists. On the one hand, the various nation-states began to assert
what they called their individual sovereignty. This meant that their
supreme courts saw themselves as exponents not of the ius commune
but of the particular law of the state. They could no longer turn
automatically to the Roman law, as adopted by the Bartolists, to fill
gaps in the law. The ius commune might be received or it might not,
depending on the suitability of the rule in question to the needs of the
state; and this decision was the courts'.
On the other hand, the academic study of law was affected by the
gradual influence of humanist ideas.' 6 Humanists were in the first place
concerned about the form of law. They showed up Justinian's Corpus
Juris for what it was, a Byzantine mosaic composed of much more
ancient materials, arranged in a confused jumble. The humanists began
to rearrange those materials in a more coherent and systematic form.
It was at this time that Justinian's Institutes, hitherto regarded as a
mere students' nutshell, became the object of special attention as demonstrating how private law could be seen as a system with a relatively

16.

M. Villey, La formation de la pens~e juridique moderne 507 (4th ed. 1975); V.

Piano Mortari, Diritto Logica Metodo nel secolo XVI (1978); M. Reulos, L'influence des
juristes humanistes sur I'evolution du droit en France (enseignement et pratique) au XVI~me
si~cle et au debut du XVIIme si~cle, La formazione storica del diritto moderno in Europa
(Atti IIl congresso internazionale della societa italiana di storia del diritto) Pt. I 281
(1977).
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simple structure. 7 By stressing the rationality of the civil law as a system,
the humanists sought to demystify it.
The humanists also exploited the inherent ambiguity which the word
for "law" has,in every European lanaguage except English. They argued
that the subject of a legal system is the Latin ius or French droit, not
in the sense of objective rules, but in the sense of subjective rights
attaching to individuals powers which they could assert through the legal
system. But once the legal system is perceived as a set of subjective
rights rather than as a set of rules, there is no place in it for procedural
rules. Law must now be distinguished from procedure. Substantive law
is concerned with rights and duties, and procedure becomes the subject
of adjective law.
Thirdly, the humanists stressed the connection, which had been
played down by the Bartolists, between the law of the Roman texts and
the circumstances of ancient Roman society at different periods. Their
main interest was academic, and they were interested in the legal texts
primarily for the light they threw on ancient culture. But by this emphasis
on the relation between law and a particular society, the humanists
supported the argument that Roman law could not be applied in toto
in their own time and that each nation receives as much or as little of
it as is suitable for it.
These trends did not destroy the ius commune, or the Bartolist
school which created it, but they introduced new uncertainties into the
practice of the civil law. It became more difficult to predict how the
professional judges of the national supreme courts would react to the
arguments put to them. The problem was not a lack of authorities but
rather a superabundance of authorities. The Bartolists tried to overcome
this problem by developing the doctrine of "the common opinion of
the doctors," the lowest common multiple of juristic opinion on the
ius commune. What everyone wanted to know, however, was whether
the judges would follow that opinion. Practitioners needed a guide to
the practice of their particular court, and judges needed to show that
their judgments were based not on whims but on accepted principles.
To meet these needs, collections of court decisions began to appear,
and a whole new genre of legal literature was born, which the recently
discovered art of printing was harnessed to disseminate. Until recently
legal historians have overlooked the large number of printed series of
civil law reports from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, s and

17. P. Stein, The Fate of the Institutional System, Huldingsbundel P. van Warmelo
218 (1984).
18. See, e.g., F. Lawson, A Common Lawyer Looks at the Civil Law 70 (1955).
"Law reports came late in Civil Law countries. Outside France they hardly existed before
the last hundred years. In France itself they really date from the Revolution .
This
is quite untrue. Cf. Stein, supra note 3, and the authorities cited therein.
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only now are we appreciating their importance. The earliest reports were
made by judges who wanted to show that, despite the official secrecy
that surrounded their deliberations, their judgments were rational and
based on authority. One of the earliest, Georges Louet,19 a judge of
the Parlement de Paris, grouped several decisions together with an
accompanying explanation that "the reason was such and such" or that
"what we can understand from them, is so and so." Whether the reports
were made by judges or by advocates, the overriding motive seems to
have been to prove that the court in question adopted a consistent
practice-consistent with itself and consistent with a proper choice among
relevant authorities.
What was the status of this forensic practice? Should it be regarded
as a source of law? To justify its existence, the jurists turned to Bartolus
and his doctrine of custom. They argued that each state, when it received
as much of the ius commune as it deemed appropriate for its needs,
created a custom. The only body that could declare authoritatively what
a state received and what it did not was its supreme court, so that each
court by custom created a different variant of the ius commune. In this
way what had been a common version of Roman Law gave way to
Roman-Dutch law, Roman-German law, Roman-Spanish law, and so
on.20 Scholars began to make collections of abrogated or rejected laws
of the Corpus Juris. The evidence was in the reports.
These reports were, of course, a form of case law, but it is a mistake
to regard them as having the same function as reported cases in the
common law.
In England the king's court superseded local courts much earlier
than elsewhere in Europe. The jurisdictions of the feudal courts and
even of the the church courts were limited, and in most cases the king's
courts offered a common law for every Englishman, wherever he happened to live and whatever his social status. Unlike other customary
systems, this law was taught and developed scientifically, not in the
English universities, it is true, but in the Inns of Court which effectively
functioned as a legal university.
But this law remained in theory unwritten, a set of rules that were
gradually revealed as successive generations of judges pulled back the
veil under which they had been lurking. They existed, if anywhere, not
in the practices of everyday life but in the "bosom of the judges."
Because of the procedure which used the jury for fact finding and did

19. J. Dawson, supra note 15, at 315.
20. K. Luig, Der Geltungsgrund des R6mischen Rechts im 18 Jahrhundert in Italien,
Frankreich und Deutschland, La formazione storica, supra note 16, pt.'I, at 819; Luig,
The Institutes of National Law in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 11972] Jurid.
Rev. 193.
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not allow appeals from jury verdicts, the number of English judges was
small; they became an elite group who assumed the status of fatherfigures, the oracles of the law. The law they declared was essentially
open-ended. It had no existence as a body of material distinct from
what the court decided. Academic treatises were of value only in so far
as they reflected what went on in court and discerned the direction that
the judges were giving to the growth of legal doctrine. That doctrine
was still expressed in terms of remedies rather than rights. What a man
could do in law was indicated only in terms of the different forms of
action available to him.
Since the common law existed only in the decisions of the judges,
they could have been free to develop it as they wanted. To prove their
consistency, however, they imposed on themselves the doctrine of stare
decisis. But this doctrine applied only when the relevant facts of the
instant case and the precedent case were the same. As a result, the law
reports for common law became increasingly pre-occupied with facts,
with the assumption that rules to be derived from the decisions are of
limited scope, and with the idea that the judges have a personal responsibility for what they decide, which has much to do with their
prestige as individuals.
The civil law, on the other hand, was considered to be contained
in recognized texts, whose mysteries were expounded by the commentators.
It was a recognized body of law, even when it was not reflected in
current court practice. There were "elegant" treatises on pure Roman
law as well as "forensic" treatises on the law in action." It was not
the jurists but the judges who were on the defensive; they were expected
to prove that their practice, in choosing among the various academic
authorities presented to them, was respectable and able to withstand
rational scrutiny. What mattered was not so much what they decided
but how they approached the legal issue. Thus, civil law reports often
did not mention the facts of the case. They functioned as justifications
of court practice in light of juristic critique, and they justified decisions
by citing the relevant texts and commentators that were utilized to reach
them. Since what mattered was what rules the court as a whole adopted,
the views of individual judges hardly counted. Civil law judges saw
themselves as bureaucrats rather than father-figures, as fungible persons
who were readily replaceable.
This deference of the judges to the jurists is well illustrated by a
procedure which became wide-spread in Germany, the Aktenversendung.22 Many courts adopted the practice of dispatching the record of
a case to a university law faculty with a request for its collective opinion

21.
22.

Jolowicz, Utility and Elegance in Civil Law Studies, 65 L.Q. Rev. 322 (1949).
J. Dawson, supra note 15, at 200.
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on the legal issues involved. The professors were not members of the
court and had no formal powers in the matter, but by custom the courts
held themselves bound to follow their opinions. It was as if the judges
wanted to avoid responsibility for their own decisions and to hide behind
the collective and impartial opinions of the law professors. The reports
thus emphasized the consistency of the decisions with academic opinions.
The decisions "acquired significance only after they had been filtered
through the minds of learned authors 23and assigned a proper place in
a setting of organized legal doctrine."
In the enterprise of directing the future course of that doctrine, the
judges were thus the junior partners to the jurists. This was less marked
in France, where the judges of the Parlementshad political pretensions,
than in Germany, but it is generally true. Only the jurists could see
the significance of a legal decision in relation to the system as a whole,
and increasingly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the jurists
emphasized the presentation of the civil law as rational system whose
individual parts fit together into a coherent whole.
CODIFICATION

It was the jurists who thus prepared the ground for the codification
movement of the eighteenth century. But that movement was, in part
at least, inspired by the layman's suspicion both of jurists and of judges
and by a popular desire to weaken the power of both groups. 24 The
jurists, it was felt, had a vested interest in maintaining the complexity
of the sources of law, since only they could indicate the narrow paths
between the marshes of conflicting doctrine. The judges, it was believed,
exploited the same complexity to justify any decisions they wanted to
reach. A code, worded in simple, straight-forward language, would, it
was hoped, both eliminate the need for academic commentaries and at
the same time reduce the discretionary power of the judges.
Of course the codes did not achieve these laudable aims. The French
Civil Code contained several general rules, taken from the jurist Pothier,
but omitted Pothier's explanations and illustrations, leaving to the courts
their application to particular cases. Before codification the judges had
too much discretion because of the profusion and complexity of the
law. Now the very simplicity and generality of the code articles left the
judges almost equally wide discretion. Portalis, the principal draftsman,
could only hope that as long as the judges were "imbued with the
spirit" of the code, 25 they would apply its articles predictably.

23. Id.at 231.
24. P. Stein, Legal Institutions, supra note 15, at 97.
25. Discours pr~liminaire du projet de code civil, para. 9, in Locr6, La legislation
civile commerciale et criminelle de la France, 1. 258 (1827).
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In form, the codes made a dramatic impact on private law, apparently wiping the slate clean and initiating an entirely fresh start.
However, the actual break with the past was less sharp than it appeared.
Lawyers realized that the code articles in many respects synthesized the
practice of the pre-code period, and they turned to the sources of that
period to elucidate the code. The return of migr&lawyers after the
defeat of Napoleon brought back to the profession many who were not
sympathetic with the code's political aims and felt more at home with
the old law. Among them was the famous gastronome Savarin, 26 who
became a judge of the Cour de cassation and alleviated the boredom
of court work by writing his masterpiece on the Physiology of Taste.
After they got over the initial shock of having all the private law
in one compendium, intelligible to a layman, both judge and jurist
happily resumed the traditional roles they had performed during the
pre-code law, with the jurist as senior partner and the judge as junior
partner. Just as the judge had relied on the jurists to guide him when
there was too much law, so now he turned to the jurists when there
was too little; and the jurists looked back to the traditional learning to
provide the missing detail.
The first multi-volume commentary on the code, that of Toullier,
began to appear as early as 1811 .27It was a revival of "doctrine,"
which seemed to have been buried under the weight of codification,
and its appearance was greeted by Napoleon, who thought he was done
with commentaries, with surprised irritation. Although these commentaries were arranged in the new order, they were full of references to
the pre-code sources-but to the juristic commentaries rather than the
old reports. The latter were now far less relevant, and tended to be
ignored. Reports of new court decisions were, however, collected and
published in the old way, and they too stressed continuity with the old
law. That this was officially approved is confirmed by the encyclopedic
works of Philippe Merlin, procureur-generalof the Cour de cassation.
As Dawson puts it: "He was immensely learned in the law of the old
rgime which had supposedly been supplanted," and the court relied
on him for guidance through "the great empty spaces around the high
'28
superstructure of the Civil Code."
The codes themselves were regarded as juristic treatises, from which
the footnote references had somehow been omitted. Indeed the draftsmen
of some later nineteenth-century codes, based on the French model,

26. G.
3600.
27. J.
1904: livre
28. J.

Hardwicke, Jean Anthelme Brillat-Savarin, [19841 The Law Society's Gazette
Charmant & A. Chausse, Les interpr6tes du Code Civil, Le Code Civil 1804du centenaire 144 (1904).
Dawson, supra note 15, at 383.

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 46

such as the Argentine Civil Code of 1869,29 characteristically accompanied
their texts with explanatory footnotes and references in the manner of
the medieval Gloss. If we fail to view the codes historically, we risk
exaggerating the effect of codification on the civil law.
Recently much emphasis has been placed on the importance of
procedure and methodology in characterizing a system as civil or common
law.30 However, methodology has a much greater impact on a legal
system in its formative periods than when its main institutions have
been established. We should bear this in mind when considering the
situation of the Louisiana Civil Code.
The French Civil Code was drafted in the spirit of the Revolution;
it was presented to the world as a new beginning, as marking a clean
break with the past. In recently colonial Louisiana, however, the ideology
was not the same. Those concerned with the law were hardly in full
sympathy with the ideals of the Revolution; they wanted in many respects
to maintain the status quo. Fashion and political change demanded an
authoritative statement of the law. The first code of 1808 looked liked
the French Code in style, although it contained some Roman law thought
relevant to Louisiana which was not in the French code, such as. the
rules of public rights on the river banks (articles 452 and 456), the sale
of a hope (article 2451), and the action for things thrown onto the
street (article 177). In 1817 the Louisiana Supreme Court squashed any
radicals who might have thought that their code should be treated as
a new beginning by holding that the old law was still in force, unless
it was actually inconsistent with the code."
The problem for the developing Lousiana law in the nineteenth
century was the absence of jurists who could make it their special concern
to monitor the application of the law and keep it on course. There
were, of course, capable lawyers such as Edward Livingston, whom my
predecessor Sir Henry Maine in 1856 called "the first legal genius of
modern times," 32 but, although they drafted legislation, they could not
devote the time to the continuous commentaries on its application which
were required. Continental commentaries were imported but they gradually became less relevant than they had been in the colonial period.
So the commission for the 1825 code back-tracked and added a good
deal of detail to flesh out the general rules in the manner of a juristic

'29. Wholly drafted by D. Velez Sarsfield; see Carri6, Judge Made Law Under A
Civil Code, 41 La. L. Rev. 993, 995 (1981).
30. Osakwe, Cogitations on the Civil Law Tradition in Louisiana: Civil Code Revision
and Beyond, 52 Rev. Jurid. U.P.R. 179, 187 (1983).
31. Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 93, 94 (La. 1817); A. Yiannopoulos, The Civil
Code of Louisiana, in Louisiana Civil Code xiii (West ed. 1985).
32. Roman law and legal education, Cambridge Essays 17 (1856), reprinted in Maine's
Village Communities in the East and West 330, 360 (enlarged 3d ed. 1876).
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commentary. Maine described the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 as "of
all republications of Roman law, the one which appears to us the clearest,
the fullest, the most philosophical and the best adapted to the exigencies
of modern society." 3
An example is the law of formation of contracts. The French Code,

which was followed in the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808, contained
nothing about offer and acceptance except a broad rule, derived from
Roman law through Pothier, that there must be agreement. Whether or

not there is an agreement in a particular case is thus a question of fact,
and in principle the French courts are left with wide discretion to find
that the parties have agreed or not. 4 When perplexed, they can turn
to juristic discussions. The Louisiana Civil Code of 1825, however,
contains a number of rules about offer and acceptance.35 They are mainly
taken from Toullier. 3 6 But these rules look rather like the common law

rules relating to the formation of a contract, and that made it easier
for judges to turn to those rules for further guidance. After all, jurists

such as Sir William Jones were saying that consent is consent the world
over and that Pothier's
doctrine of contracts was "law at Westminster
' 37

as well as Orleans.
The compilers of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 not only added
more detail, they also included explanatory comment. They made it clear
what parts of the old law were no longer in force, and they included

explanations of the reasoning behind the matter that was retained. The
code was no longer addressed to the ordinary citizen, but to advocates
and judges; it had become technical. Left to themselves, the judges

33. Id.
34. B. Nicholas, French Law of Contract 17, 59 (1982).
35. According to Maine, supra note 32, "The most important chapters, including all
those on contract, are entirely from his [Livingston's] pen." Cf. C. Hunt, Life and
Services of Edward Livingston, supra note 12, at 26: "His part of the work was largely
on the subject of conventional obligations." Since he is the first signatory, Livingston
was probably the author of the Preliminary Report of the Code Commissioners dated
February 13, 1823, reprinted in Louisiana Legal Archives I lxxxv-xcv (1937), which announced that the commissioner working on a Code of Procedure (probably Livingston
since he had drafted the 1805 code of practice) was "advanced in several titles of the
third book" of the Civil Code.
36. Pascal, Duration and Revocability of an Offer, 1 La. L. Rev. 182 (1938); Comment, Contracts By Correspondence in Anglo-American, French and Louisiana Law, 9
Tul. L. Rev. 590, 599 (1935). The relevant passages are Toullier, Le Droit civil franqais
suivant l'ordre du Code, Liv. Ill, Tit. 1Il, chap. II, paras. 24-34. At the end of para.
24, he cites a decision of the Cour de cassation of 4 July 1810, on the question of
whether an offer made to several persons can always be accepted by some only and not
the others (answer: not if the offeror showed that he only intended to be bound if all
the offerees accepted.) Pascal points out that, in regard to certain rules, Toullier cites
with approval the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht of 1794.
37. Sir W. Jones, Essay on the Law of Bailments 29 (2d ed. 1804).
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naturally assumed a more prominent posture. They filled the vacuum
left by the absence of jurists and assumed the oracular role of their
colleagues in the common law states. The reports began to include
judicial dissents which are, in general, alien to the civil law.
The introduction of civil juries was inevitably accompanied by essentially common law procedure and rules of evidence, and they clearly
affected the way the law was applied. But they could not of themselves
make Louisiana a common law state. After all, in England civil juries
were effectively abolished in most cases fifty years ago,3" and after a
suitable interval, the law of civil evidence was changed39 so that almost
everything is now admissible if the judge considers it relevant. But these
changes have not impaired the status of English law as a common law
system.
If the use of purely formal criteria is the correct way to characterize
a legal system, it should be applicable to public law as well as to private
law. But this can lead to odd results. In France the civil code does not
apply to any transaction involving the state or its agencies, and the
ordinary courts have no jurisdiction in such cases. In the last two
centuries, however, the French administrative courts, headed by the
Conseil d'Egtat, have developed a series of rules which offer protection
to the individual against the state and which are the envy of most other
countries, There is no code and few statutes in this area; the development
of French administrative law has been based almost entirely on case
law. 4" French public lawyers pride themselves on having a different ethos
from that of the "privatists;" and their technique recalls that of the
common law in its formative period. In the same period in the United
States, the Constitution was subjected by the Supreme Court to an
elaborate evolutionary exegesis, which in recent decades at least, has
been very much influenced by academic discussions and commentaries.'
The Court's technique with the text of the Constitution recalls that of
the civil law rather than that in which the common law has developed.
But for all that, France is still a civil law country, and the United
States still a common law country.

38. Adminstration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933 and Rules of Supreme Court, Order 36, restrict the right to trial by jury in civil cases to defamation and
similar issues; cf. Ward v. James [19661 1 Q. B. 273.
39. Civil Evidence Act, 1968.
40. L. Brown & J. Garner, French Administrative Law (3d ed. 1983); R. David,
French Law: Its Structure, Sources and Methodology 103 (M. Kindred trans. 1972).
41. The practices of submitting written briefs, especially in appeal cases, and of
providing the judges with law clerks to assist in analyzing them, have together created a
more academic tone (a kind of trahison des clercs?) than that in most other common
law countries, where the legal arguments are still presented orally and the judges have
no clerks.
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Looking at structure and substance rather than procedure and method,
I find it difficult to regard a private law that includes predial servitudes,
usufructs, redhibition in sale, necessary deposit, mandate, stipulation for
a third party, and management of affairs as other than a civil law
system.
The point I have tried to make is that, in the absence of jurists
performing their traditional watch dog role, the drift towards the common law for over a century and a half after the end of colonial rule
was almost inevitable. But recent decades have seen the advent of
Louisiana jurists who are ready to monitor court practice, to relate
decisions to the rest of the system, and to counteract the tendency of
all courts to see their cases in isolation. They can look ahead and
generally plot the direction of Louisiana private law as a whole. They
cannot reverse the drift away from the civil law overnight, but I believe
that if they rise to the challenge, they still have time to do it. But my
time is up.

